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The Act Itself offers a deeper understanding of what is going on in our own moral thoughts about human behaviour. Jonathan Bennett argues that many of the descriptions of behaviour on which our thoughts are based are confused; others may be free of confusion, but still we are not clear in our minds about what thoughts they are. His aim is to show how to use conceptual analysis to get more control of our thoughts and thus of our moral and intellectuallives.

Intro -- LAW And the Philosophy of Action: Social, Political & Legal Philosophy, Volume 3 -- Contents -- Presentation -- LAW AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION -- 1. Compatibilism(s) for Neuroscientists -- 2. Intending to Aid -- 3. Embarking on a Crime -- 4. Responsibility and The Doctrine of Double Effect -- 5. What Temptation Could Not Be: A Lesson from the Criminal Law -- 6. Legal Agreements and the Capacities of Agents -- 7. Law, Action, and Collective Agency: The Cognitive Integration Approach

Front Matter /Andrey Maidansky and Vesa Oittinen -- Introduction /Andrey Maidansky and Vesa Oittinen -- Activity and the Search for True Materialism /David Bakhurst -- 'Praxis' as the Criterion of Truth? The Aporias of Soviet Marxism and the Activity Approach /Vesa Oittinen -- Reality as Activity: The Concept of Praxis in Soviet Philosophy /Andrey Maidansky -- The Category of Activity in Soviet Philosophy /Inna Titarenko -- The Activity Approach and Metaphysics /Edward M. Swiderski -- Abstract and Concrete Understanding of Activity: 'Activity' and 'Labour' in Soviet Philosophy /Sergey Mareev -- The Kiev Philosophical School in the Light of the Marxist Theory of Activity /Elena Mareeva -- The Evolution of Batishchev's Views on the Nature of Objective Activity, and the Limits of the Activity Approach /Alexander Khamidov -- The Activity Approach in Soviet Philosophy and Contemporary Cognitive Studies /Vladislav Lektorsky -- The Concept of the Scheme in the Activity Theories of Ilyenkov and Piaget /Pentti Määttänen -- The Ideal and the Dream-World: Evald Ilyenkov and Walter Benjamin on the Significance of Material Objects /Alex Levant -- Bibliography /Andrey Maidansky and Vesa Oittinen -- Index /Andrey Maidansky and Vesa Oittinen.

Cover -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- 1 Anti-Kantianism and Pragmatist Characteristics -- 2 Peirce's Incomplete Synthetic Turn -- 3 A New Paradigm for Reasoning -- 4 A New Tool: Complete Gesture -- 5 Gestures and Creativity -- 6 Figural and Narrative Identity -- 7 Writing as Complete Gesture -- 8 Gesture, Morality, Education -- Conclusions and Further Studies -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z

Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency-a role with great significance for the study of action theory. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing an overview of the central developments in each area with an emphasis on the role of temporality. Including contributions by established, rising, and new voices in the field, Agency Through Time brings together analytic work in philosophy of action together with contributions from continental philosophy, and also acknowledges the growing influence of the Pittsburgh school in recent developments in action theory

"This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agent's inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, 'objective' approach in normative ethics. It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label 'agent', must be engaged during an act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an act's moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomson's dismissal of the agent knowledge and volition requirements, Scanlon's arguments for a derivative relevance of intentions to permissibility, Frowe's "causal roles" of agents in the moral evaluation of acts, and Bennett's explicit defense of the objective approach. The book concludes by offering the author's preferred replacement for the objective approach, an Aristotelian-Thomist view of acts. Acts, Intentions, and Moral Evaluation will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, just war theory, the ethics of self-defense, and philosophy of action"

REASON AND NORMATIVITY -- Impressum -- CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- CONTRASTING CONCEPTS OF AGENCYAND THE SPACE OF REASONS - TERRY PINKARD -- ACTING AS THE INTERNAL ENDOF ACTING - SEBASTIAN RÖDL -- WHY THERE IS NO FACT OF REASON INTHE GROUNDWORK. THREE ARGUMENTS - DIETER SCHÖNECKER -- THE RECOVERY OF ACTION IN SOCIAL THEORY:ACTING OUT OF SENTIMENT, ACTING OUT OFCHARACTER, ACTING OUT OF INTEREST,ACTING OUT OF WILL - ANA MARTA GONZÁLEZ -- SIMMEL AND RICKERT ON AESTHETICSAND HISTORICAL EXPLANATION - JOHN LEVI MARTIN -- THE REALIST SOCIOLOGICALAPPROACH TO ACTION - ALEJANDRO N. GARCÍA MARTÍNEZ -- LEVERAGE AND TRUTH - SOPHIE DJIGO -- MIXED ACTIONS IN THE WORK OFHARRY FRANKFURT - TERESA ENRÍQUEZ -- PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE ANDPERCEPTION - EVGENIA MYLONAKI -- NAME INDEX

This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agent's inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, "objective" approach in normative ethics. It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label "agent," must be engaged during an act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an act's moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomson's dismissal of the agent knowledge and volition requirements, Scanlon's arguments for a derivative relevance of intentions to permissibility, Frowe's "causal roles" of agents in the moral evaluation of acts, and Bennett's explicit defense of the objective approach. The book concludes by offering the author's preferred replacement for the objective approach, an Aristotelian-Thomist view of acts. Acts, Intentions, and Moral Evaluationwill be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, just war theory, the ethics of self-defense, and philosophy of action.

How do humans, their needs, and technology interact in society? Marcel Siegler explores the dialectical relationship between human needs and desires, the demands and requirements of the built world, and the forms of organization that hold both humans and the built world together. He argues that complex societal constellations emerge from the actions individuals perform with the technological means at hand to satisfy their needs and desires in the short and long run. Based on a novel, complementary reading of French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, the study develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the intricate machinations of sociotechnical systems from a perspective on situated human-technology interaction.

Preliminary Material -- Compatibilism(s) for Neuroscientists /Michael S. Moore -- Intending to Aid /Gideon Yaffe -- Embarking on a Crime /Sarah Paul -- Responsibility and the Doctrine of Double Effect /Claire Finkelstein -- What Temptation Could Not Be: A Lesson from the Criminal Law /Gabriel S. Mendlow -- Legal Agreements and the Capacities of Agents /Andrei A. Buckareff and Lara E. Kasper-Buckareff -- Law, Action, and Collective Agency: The Cognitive Integration Approach /Carlos Montemayor.